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FOREWORD
or more than two decades, FIU professors Guillermo 
J. Grenier and Hugh Gladwin have carefully tracked 
the opinions of the Cuban-American community in 
South Florida. Their ongoing poll was designed to reliably 
measure the views of Cuban Americans on U.S. policy 
options toward Cuba. The consistency of some of the 
survey responses, as well as the shift in others, provides 
the most complete picture of Cuban-American political 
attitudes over time.
        The FIU Cuba Poll has become a standard reference 
on the public opinions and demographic profile of Cuban 
immigrants and their descendants in the United States. 
The poll’s findings have circulated widely, appearing in 
wire services, major newspapers, and television news, as 
well as in academic analyses of the political ideology and 
behavior of Cuban Americans. Scholars and journalists 
have extensively cited the FIU Cuba Poll as solid evidence 
of the generational and ideological shifts among Cuban 
Americans and their impact on U.S. policy toward Cuba. 
The survey data have been mined to document and 
analyze Cuban Americans’ attitudes toward maintaining 
the U.S. trade embargo of Cuba, re-establishing 
diplomatic relations, negotiating with the Cuban 
government, supporting human rights on the island, 
traveling and sending remittances to family members 
still in Cuba, and other policies. In addition, the 2014 FIU 
Cuba Poll included questions on several timely issues, 
such as the impact of Raúl Castro’s economic reforms, the 
development of small private businesses on the island, 
Cuba’s new migration and travel law, and the respondents’ 
voting preferences in the last presidential elections.
        The 2014 FIU Cuba Poll reveals numerous 
differences in the public opinions of Cuban Americans 
based on their year of arrival in the United States, as well 
as age and place of birth. As a group, those who left 
Cuba before and after 1994 display different attitudinal 
patterns. For instance, recent arrivals are more likely than 
earlier ones to oppose the continuation of the embargo; 
support a dialogue among exiles, dissidents, and the 
Cuban government; and favor sending medicines, 
food, and money, as well as unrestricted travel to Cuba.        
Furthermore, the most recent wave of Cuban immigrants 
tends to favor the re-establishment of diplomatic relations 
between Cuba and the United States, to a much larger 
degree than those who arrived earlier. In sum, the 
findings of the poll suggest that Cuban immigrants who 
left the island in the last two decades support engaging 
with Cuba more often than those who left in the first 
decades after the revolution. As these later immigrant 
waves increase their weight within the Cuban-American 
community, as well as the numbers of those born in the 
United States increase relative to those born abroad, swift 
demographic changes are reshaping Cuban-American 
attitudes regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba.    
     The Cuban Research Institute has proudly sponsored 
the FIU Cuba Poll over time, together with FIU’s Institute 
for Public Opinion Research, the Center for Labor 
Research and Studies, and the Department of Global and 
Sociocultural Studies. The Brookings Institution, the Cuba 
Study Group, the Ford Foundation, The Miami Herald, the 
Christopher Reynolds Foundation, and the South Florida 
Sun-Sentinel have funded the poll in the past. This year, 
we were fortunate to receive the financial contributions of 
the Trimpa Group and the Open Society Foundations.
     I would like to take this opportunity to thank the co-
principal investigators Guillermo J. Grenier and Hugh 
Gladwin for their sustained efforts to study the changing 
attitudes of the Cuban-American population. I would also 
like to acknowledge the enthusiastic support of the staff 
members of the Cuban Research Institute: Sebastián 
Arcos, Associate Director; Aymee Correa, Public Affairs 
Manager, and Paola Salavarria Romero, Office Assistant; 
as well as our student assistants Lennie Gómez and 
Alfredo González.
 
Jorge Duany, Ph.D.
Director and Professor
Cuban Research Institute
Florida International University
F
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A slight majority of the Cuban-American community 
in Miami-Dade County opposes continuing the U.S. 
embargo of Cuba. Countywide, 52% of the respondents 
oppose continuing the embargo. This percentage rises 
among Cuban Americans ages 18-29, 62% of whom 
oppose continuing the embargo. Similarly, 58% of those 
arriving since 1995 oppose continuing the embargo. 
Among registered voters, the split is nearly equal, 
with 51% in favor of continuing the embargo and 49% 
opposing its continuation. Support for continuing the 
embargo is strongest among Republican registered 
voters (figure 2).
A large majority favors diplomatic relations with Cuba 
(68%), with younger respondents strongly backing the 
policy shift (90%). Support for re-establishing diplomatic 
ties maintains a solid majority among all age groups up 
to age 70, after which it drops to a third of the population 
supporting the policy. Those arriving since 1995 favor 
the policy shift by 80%. A majority of registered voters 
express support—55%. This number balloons to 83% 
among non-registered voters (figure 4).
A large majority of respondents (69%) favor the lifting of 
travel restrictions impeding all Americans from traveling 
to Cuba. Younger respondents overwhelmingly endorse 
this policy shift (89%), as do the most recent arrivals 
(80%). Approximately 58% of registered voters also favor 
unrestricted travel by all Americans (figure 5). 
Similarly, 71% of the respondents support the 
continuation of “people-to-people” travel opportunities 
currently endorsed by U.S. policy, with the two earliest 
cohorts falling short of majority support for the policy 
(49% and 40% respectively). Sixty percent of registered 
voters favor the policy as well (figure 6).
Cuba is one of only four countries designated as a
“State Sponsor of Terrorism”—a list that includes Iran, 
Sudan, and Syria. This designation restricts a broad range 
of trade and financial engagements as well as penalizes 
people and countries engaging in certain trade with 
Cuba. Sixty-three percent of Cuban Americans believe 
that Cuba should remain on the list. All cohorts of arrival 
favor this policy, although the most recent arrivals—since 
1995—express the least support—56%. A large majority 
of 18–29-year-old respondents—65%—would like to see 
Cuba removed from the list. However, an even larger 
majority of registered voters (70%) would like to keep 
Cuba on the list (figure 9).
A large majority of respondents favor the 
“wet foot/dry foot” immigration policy (63%), although 
those coming after 1980 and younger respondents 
support it considerably more than those coming before 
1980 (figure 8). Fifty-six percent of registered voters 
favor the policy.
The Cuban Adjustment Act receives strong backing 
from the respondents. Eighty-six percent strongly or 
mostly support the policy that has been applied to 
Cuban arrivals on U.S. soil since 1966. Ninety-two 
percent of recent arrivals favor the policy while 64% 
of 1959–1964 arrivals agree with the policy. Eighty 
percent of registered voters support the policy 
(figure 7).
Registered voters were asked how likely they would 
be to vote for a candidate for political office who 
supported the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. 
Fifty-three percent responded they would be very likely 
or somewhat likely to do so. Younger voters expressed 
stronger support—75% in the 18–29 cohort (figure 11).
Registered voters were also asked about the likelihood 
of voting for a candidate who supports replacing 
the embargo with a policy that increases support for 
independent business owners in Cuba. Fifty-seven 
percent of the voters said they were likely to do so 
(very/somewhat). Seventy-one percent of new arrivals, 
compared to 40% of the earliest post-revolution 
arrivals, said they were likely to do so. Almost twice 
as many younger voters (18–29) were likely to vote for 
such a candidate as older voters (65+)—73% to 37% 
(figure 12).
The final question on embargo options asked 
registered voters how likely they would be to vote for 
a candidate who supports replacing the embargo 
with a policy that increases pressure on the Cuban 
government over human rights. Eighty-one percent of 
voters said they were very or somewhat likely to do so. 
A large majority of all age groups expressed this view 
(figure 13).
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INTRODUCTION
he Cuban-American community in Miami-Dade County 
is the largest concentration of Cubans outside the 
island. The community’s significance for local and 
national elections is frequently highlighted during election 
cycles and its members are often credited, or criticized, for 
controlling U.S. policy toward Cuba. When we initiated the 
FIU Cuba Poll in 1991, our intention was to take an ideological 
snapshot of the Cuban-American community in Miami-
Dade County (formerly Dade County) at a time of significant 
changes in the geopolitical environment. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the transitions occurring in Eastern Europe 
had a direct impact on the Cuban state. We were curious 
to see what impact these global changes would have on 
the diasporic population’s view of the future of U.S./Cuba 
relations. We learned a great deal about our community in 
that first poll. We learned that desire to promote change on 
the island was just as strong in 1991 as in 1961, but years of 
frustration and false hopes had created a community that was 
not monolithic in its approaches to encouraging changes on 
the island. That finding alone—that Cuban Americans had 
diverse opinions about how to approach U.S./Cuba relations—
was newsworthy. 
 Before we started polling the community, its 
homogeneous nature when it came to U.S./Cuba relations was 
taken for granted (even by us, the investigators). All Cuban 
Americans allegedly supported current U.S. policies. All 
Cuban Americans supposedly wanted to tighten the screws 
on the Cuban government to force changes on the island. 
Our initial poll found that although most Cubans did support 
some elements of U.S. policy, others also hoped for policy 
changes that would facilitate travel and humanitarian contact 
between Cubans on the island and in South Florida. The more 
conciliatory voices were not necessarily expressing support 
for the regime, we must add. They were expressing their 
desire to promote change just as much as those advocating 
more isolationist policies. Many articulated the frustration 
accumulated in over 30 years of living a diasporic existence 
that had seen no changes in U.S. policy and, more importantly 
for them, no changes on the island—at least not the types of 
changes that would finally unite Cubans everywhere.
 We conducted two polls in 1991, the only time we’ve 
been able to find funding for two polls that close together, 
because we felt that neither Cuba nor the Cuban-American 
community in South Florida would ever be the same after 
this historic moment. We were right, but not as dramatically 
as we anticipated. Cuba underwent and survived El Período 
Especial (the Special Period of economic crisis, beginning 
in 1989) and the application of the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, 
which tightened the U.S. embargo on Cuba. The Cuban-
American community also survived as a population living 
in the diaspora, the imposition of travel restrictions by the 
George W. Bush administration, and an intense influx of 
new Cubans after the 1995 immigration agreement with 
Cuba established a regular migration flow for the first time 
in decades. 
       Many of the findings from the first polls more than 20 
years ago have remained significant in the form of trends.
Those exiles who experienced the seismic changes 
brought about by the 1959 revolution are more likely to 
express support for the isolationist strategies codified in 
U.S. policy toward Cuba. Subsequent waves express more 
of a willingness to endorse policies that increase contact 
between Cubans here and there. Time has also seen a 
slow weakening of the Republican Party hold on registered 
Cuban-American voters. From a dominance of 70% in 
the early 1990s, registered Republicans have declined to 
approximately 53% of the population in the current poll. 
Yet, when it comes to U.S. Cuba policy, the more things 
change, the more they stay the same.
       This poll is a continuation of the tradition started more 
than two decades ago. We remain curious about how the 
Cuban-American community views U.S./Cuba relations. 
We are aware of the heterogeneity of the community and 
are becoming more accustomed to hearing its many 
voices. This survey shows that members of the Cuban 
diaspora in Miami-Dade County have diverse views of 
how they would like the U.S. government to deal with 
the Cuban government. Some support continuity, others 
support a change of course. Most favor a mixture of both. 
What remains clear is that Cuba inspires debate and 
passions in all Cubans. Those who came to the United 
States immediately after the revolution are an increasingly 
smaller percentage of the population, but their influence 
remains strong even as their ideas are transformed and 
reinterpreted by newer migrants from the island. 
       Our poll preserves a record of the continuity and 
change occurring in the Cuban-American community in 
South Florida. It is a record of a transition as dramatic and 
far-reaching as the transitions occurring on the island. This 
is our transition and it’s happening daily, poll or no poll, as 
Cubans everywhere look to the future with the hope that, 
indeed, todo tiempo futuro tiene que ser mejor (all future 
times have to be better).
Guillermo J. Grenier, Ph.D.
Professor
Hugh Gladwin, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies
Florida International University
T
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THE POLLSTERS
Guillermo J. Grenier is Professor of Sociology 
and Graduate Program Director in the Department 
of Global and Sociocultural Studies at Florida 
International University. 
 Born in Havana, Cuba, Dr. Grenier is one of 
the founders of the Miami school of social analysis, 
and has authored or coauthored six books and 
dozens of articles on labor, migration, immigrant 
incorporation, and Cuban-American ideological 
profiles, particularly in the Greater Miami area. His 
books include This Land Is Our land: Newcomers 
and Established Residents in Miami, with Alex 
Stepick, Max Castro, and Marvin Dunn (University 
of California Press, 2003); The Legacy of Exile: 
Cubans in the United States, with Lisandro Pérez 
(Allyn & Bacon, 2002); Newcomers in the Workplace: 
Immigrants and the Restructuring of the U.S. 
Economy, with Louise Lamphere and Alex Stepick 
(Temple University Press, 1994; winner of the 
Conrad Arensberg Award, American Anthropological 
Association); and Miami Now! Immigration, Ethnicity, 
and Social Change, edited with Alex Stepick 
(University Press of Florida, 1992). 
 Dr. Grenier has been a Fulbright Fellow and 
a Faculty Fellow of the University of Notre Dame’s 
Institute of Latino Studies as well as Director of the 
Florida Center for Labor Research and Studies. 
He lectures nationally and internationally on his 
research. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology and his 
M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of 
New Mexico at Albuquerque.
Hugh Gladwin is the past Director of the Institute for 
Public Opinion Research and Associate Professor in 
the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies at 
Florida International University. 
 His major area of research is the application 
of survey research and GIS tools to understand large 
urban settings of high cultural and demographic 
diversity. Within that framework, a particular interest is 
to better model the interactions between the human 
population and natural systems such as the South 
Florida ecosystem and natural events like hurricanes 
and climate change. 
 He is a coeditor (with Walter Gillis Peacock 
and Betty Hearn Morrow) and contributor to the 
book Hurricane Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender, and the 
Sociology of Disaster (Routledge, 1997) and author 
of numerous publications and presentations on 
disaster mitigation, public health, and public opinion, 
especially among Cuban Americans. Along with Dr. 
Arthur Heise, he directed the FIU/Florida Poll, which 
tracked public opinion statewide from 1988 to 2006. 
He is a research scientist in the Florida Coastal 
Everglades Long-Term Ecological Research project 
(FCE LTER) and the Mexico/US LTER Hurricane 
Research network. 
 In Miami-Dade County, Dr. Gladwin serves 
as a member of the Steering Committee of the 
Local Mitigation Strategy and was appointed by the 
County Commission to be on the county Climate 
Change Advisory Task Force. He is also a member 
of the Socioeconomic Working Group of the NOAA 
Hurricane Forecast Improvement Project. He holds a 
Ph.D. in Anthropology from Stanford University.
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METHODOLOGICAL NOTE
This survey looks at how the Cuban-American community in Miami-Dade County, Florida, views 
current U.S./Cuba policy. To appraise trends in the community we ask many of the same questions 
we’ve asked for more than 20 years. We measure support for the embargo as well as changing 
individual interests associated with U.S./Cuba policy such as travel restrictions, trade and investment 
opportunities, diplomatic engagement, and U.S. immigration policy. We also measure support for 
political candidates who might be willing to propose changes in the embargo in exchange for policies 
that favor the strengthening of small business growth and human rights on the island. The poll carefully 
documents the respondents’ demographic characteristics and how they relate to their attitudes toward 
U.S./Cuba relations. 
The 2014 FIU Cuba Poll was conducted between February and May 2014. It was administered to a 
random sample of 1,000 Cuban-American residents of Miami-Dade County, age 18 and over. The 
sample was generated from telephone exchanges using standard random-digit-dialing procedures 
to ensure that each phone number has an equal chance of being chosen for the sample. Interviews 
were conducted with respondents who have both landline phones and cell phones. Bilingual 
interviewers conducted the survey in Spanish and English, depending on the respondents’ preference. 
The countywide margin of error is plus or minus 3.1% at the 95% confidence level. For more 
methodological details, see Appendix 1.
This report presents the responses to key questions. The exact wording for each question, along with 
the Spanish version, is included in Appendix 2. The full survey is available at cri.fiu.edu/research/
cuba-poll/. 
The poll carefully documents 
the respondents’ demographic 
characteristics and how they relate 
to their attitudes toward U.S./Cuba 
relations. 
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Respondents were asked how well they thought the United States embargo of Cuba was working. An 
overwhelming majority, 71%, expressed the view that the embargo was “not working at all” or “not 
very well.” Younger respondents, the most recent arrivals, and non-registered voters are more likely to 
view the embargo as working “well” or “very well.” The difference is evident in the age cohorts: 52% 
of respondents 65 and over feel that the embargo has not worked at all, while only 27% of younger 
respondents (18–29) express that opinion.
Almost three-quarters of Cubans living in Miami-
Dade County believe the embargo has not worked.
Figure 1: Overall, do you think the U.S. embargo of Cuba has worked very 
well, well, not very well, or not at all?
1959-1964
1965-1973
1974-1980
1981-1994
1995-2014
8 13 29 50
8 12 23 57
8 20 23 49
9 24 28 39
11 18 30 40
%
17%
20%
35%
27%
17%
10%
13%
26%
52%
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+
11%
19%
32%
38%
  8%
21%
26%
45%
42% 29%
11% 18%
Not at all
Not very well
Well
Very well
Not registered
Registered
11 25 29 35
13 29 4910
%
Year Left Cuba
Age Range
Registered to Vote
Not Registered 
Registered
MAIN FINDINGS
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Fifty-two percent of the respondents oppose the 
continuation of the embargo.
Figure 2:  Do you favor or oppose continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba?
1959-1964
1965-1973
1974-1980
1981-1994
1995-2014
55 45
57 43
59 41
56 44
42 58
%
Favor
Oppose
48% 52%
Not registered
Registered
43 57
51 49
%
A slight majority of the Cuban-American community in Miami-Dade County opposes continuing 
the U.S. embargo of Cuba. Countywide, 52% of the respondents oppose continuing the 
embargo. This percentage rises among Cuban Americans ages 18-29, 62% of whom oppose 
continuing the embargo. Similarly, 58% of those arriving since 1995 oppose continuing the 
embargo. Among registered voters, the split is nearly equal, with 51% in favor of continuing 
the embargo and 49% opposing its continuation.
The increase in the opposition to the embargo continues a trend fueled not only by an 
ideological shift among exiles frustrated with the inability of the embargo to bring about the 
desired changes on the island. It is also the result of the profound shift in the demographic 
composition of the Cuban origin population in the Miami area. More than a third of all Cuban 
Americans living in Miami today have arrived since 1995. In our survey, these respondents 
are most likely to oppose a continuation of the embargo. They are also the least likely to be 
registered to vote.
Year Left Cuba
Registered to Vote
8%
62%
17%
60%
40%
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+
45%
55%
  45%
55%
Age Range
Not Registered 
Registered
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Most respondents favor increasing economic 
relations with the island.
Figure 3: 
Strongly Favor
Mostly Favor
Mostly Oppose
Strongly Oppose
57%25%
13%
5%
•	 Allow companies to sell medicine to Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly 
oppose this? 
•	 Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or 
strongly oppose this? 
•	 Some U.S. companies have managed to establish limited business relations with Cuba to sell grain, other 
agricultural products, and medicine. Should this kind of trade be expanded, kept the same, or stopped?
57%20%
16%
7%
Strongly Favor
Mostly Favor
Mostly Oppose
Strongly Oppose
Expanded
Kept the Same
Stopped
48%
28%
24%
Sell Medicine Sell Food Business Relations
Although the Cuban-American population is split on the support expressed for the embargo, 
the numbers jump dramatically when specific policy alternatives are presented. An 
overwhelming majority of the respondents endorse the selling of medicine and food and a 
significant majority supports either expanding or maintaining the existing limited trade relations 
of companies selling agricultural and medical products to the island.
A large majority of the respondents 
favor reestablishing diplomatic 
relations with Cuba. 
See Figure 4.
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Figure 4:  Do you favor or oppose the U.S. re-establishing diplomatic 
relations with Cuba?
1959-1964
1965-1973
1974-1980
1981-1994
1995-2014
47 53
40 60
49 51
65 35
80 20
%
68%
32%
Favor
Oppose
Not registered
Registered
83 17
55 45
%
A large majority of the respondents favor reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba 
(68%), with younger respondents very strongly backing the policy shift (90%). Support for 
re-establishing diplomatic ties maintains a solid majority among all age groups up to age 70, 
after which it drops to a third of the population favoring the policy. Cubans arriving after 1995 
are the most likely group to endorse the re-establishment of relations. But substantial support 
is found in all arrival cohorts. This is evident when we look at the opinion of registered voters. 
A majority of registered voters, 55%, express support for re-establishing diplomatic relations 
with the island. This number balloons to 83% among non-registered voters.
Registered to Vote
Year Left Cuba
Sixty-eight percent of Cubans living in Miami-Dade 
County favor diplomatic relations with Cuba.
88%
12%
17%
41%
59%
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+
78%
22%
  68%
32%
Age Range
Not Registered 
Register d
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Figure 5:  Should unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba be allowed 
or not?
1959-1964
1965-1973
1974-1980
1981-1994
1995-2014
43 57
38 62
51 49
71 29
80 20
%
YES, Allowed
NO, Not Allowed
69%
31%
Not registered
Registered
82 18
58 42
%
Cuba is the only country in the world with which the United States has a policy of restricting travel 
to some American citizens and not others. When asked if unrestricted travel by all Americans to 
Cuba should be allowed or not, 69% of the respondents responded affirmatively. The earliest 
arrivals to the United States, however, express strong opposition to the opening up of unrestricted 
travel to all Americans. Fifty-eight percent of registered voters endorse this type of policy shift in 
relations with the island.
Registered to Vote
Year Left Cuba
Sixty-nine percent of the respondents favor unrestricted 
travel by all Americans to Cuba.
89%
11%
17%
45%
55%
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+
78%
22%
  69%
31%
Age Range
Not Registered 
Registered
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Figure 6:  Currently, all Americans can travel to Cuba in people-to-people trips 
organized by special travel agencies and designed to encourage communication 
among citizens of the U.S. and citizens of Cuba. These trips are usually organized 
for educational, religious or research purposes. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, 
mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this type of people-to-people travel?
1959-1964
1965-1973
1974-1980
1981-1994
1995-2014
32 17 11 41
27 13 15 45
40 14 10 36
46 22 6 26
65 19 12
%
4[
Strongly Favor
Mostly Favor
Mostly Oppose
Strongly Oppose
52%
19%
22%
7%
62 22
3
12
44 16 10 31
%
[
A large majority of the respondents favor the continuation of “people-to-people” travel 
opportunities currently endorsed by U.S. policy, with the two earliest cohorts falling short of 
majority support for the policy. Sixty percent of registered voters favor the policy as well.
Registered to Vote
Year Left Cuba
Seventy-one percent of the respondents support the 
continuation of “people-to-people” travel opportunities.
31%
17%
12%
40%
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+
63%
19%
4%
14%
72%
18%
3%
7%
  47%
22%
6%
24%
Age Range
Not Registered 
Registered
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Figure 7:  Since 1966, the entrance of Cubans into the United States has been 
regulated by the Cuban Adjustment Act. This law stipulates that Cuban citizens and 
their accompanying spouses and children may get a green card and become residents 
of the U.S. one year after arriving in the country. This automatic application process 
is not usual for other immigrant groups. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly 
oppose, or strongly oppose the current policy of accepting Cubans into the U.S.?
1959-1964
1965-1973
1974-1980
1981-1994
1995-2014
47 17 10 26
59 17 10 15
55 25 18
64 25 4 7
76 16 5 4
%
2[
66%
20%
9%
5%
Strongly Favor
Mostly Favor
Mostly Oppose
Strongly Oppose
71 21 4
61 19 146
%
3[
The Cuban Adjustment Act receives strong backing across all cohorts. The support increases 
among more recent waves, but if there is a policy that receives consistent endorsement across 
all demographic cohorts, the Cuban Adjustment Act is that policy. Eighty-six percent favor 
strongly or mostly the policy that has been applied to Cuban arrivals on U.S. soil since 1966. 
Ninety-two percent of recent arrivals support the policy, as do 64% of 1959–1964 arrivals. 
Eighty percent of registered voters favor the policy.
Registered to Vote
Year Left Cuba
Eighty-six percent of the respondents support the 
Cuban Adjustment Act.
58%
19%
6%
17%
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+
69%
21%
5%
5%
79%
19%
1%
1%
  62%
21%
6%
11%
Age Range
Not Registered 
Registered
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Figure 8: As it stands, Cubans who leave by raft or boat are sent back to Cuba if 
they are intercepted before they reach U.S. soil. If they do reach U.S. soil they are 
allowed to stay in the U.S. Do you agree or disagree with this policy?
1959-1964
1965-1973
1974-1980
1981-1994
1995-2014
52 48
54 46
50 50
64 36
66 34
%
77%
23%
17%
55%
45%
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+
66%
34%
  59%
41%
Agree
Disagree
63%
37%
Not registered
Registered
71 29
56 44
%
A large majority of the respondents favor the “wet foot/dry foot” U.S. Cuban immigration 
policy, a revision of the Cuban Adjustment Act initiated as a result of the 1995 immigration 
agreement between the United States and Cuba. Respondents leaving Cuba after 1980 
are more supportive of the policy than earlier arrivals, as are younger respondents. Majority 
support also holds among registered voters. 
Registered to Vote
Year Left Cuba
Age Range
Sixty-three percent of Cubans in Miami-Dade County 
support the current “wet foot/dry foot” policy.
The Cuban Adjustment Act 
receives strong backing across
all cohorts. 
See Figure 7.
Not Registered 
Registered
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Figure 9:  The U.S. Department of State [or U.S. government] includes Cuba on a 
list of four countries which the U.S. government considers to be State Sponsors of 
Terrorism. This designation penalizes persons and organizations engaging in certain 
activities with Cuba and the other countries on the list. The other countries on the list 
are Iran, Sudan, and Syria. Do you believe that Cuba should be kept on that list of 
penalized countries that support terrorism, or be taken off the list?
1959-1964
1965-1973
1974-1980
1981-1994
1995-2014
79 21
83 17
72 28
68 32
56 44
%
35%
65%
17%
77%
23%
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+
59%
41%
  70%
30%
Yes, Keep on List
No, Remove from List
63%
37%
Not registered
Registered
54 46
70 30
%
Cuba is one of only four countries designated as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism”—a list that includes 
Iran, Sudan, and Syria. This designation restricts a broad range of trade and financial engagements 
as well as penalizes people and countries engaging in certain trade with Cuba. The respondents 
express strong support for keeping Cuba on the list across all arrival cohorts. Even the post-1995 
cohort expresses majority support for keeping Cuba on the list. Only young respondents (18–29) 
show a strong willingness to remove Cuba from the list.
Registered to Vote
Year Left Cuba
Age Range
Sixty-three percent of Cuban Americans believe that Cuba 
should remain on the State Department list of countries 
designated as sponsors of terrorism.
Not Registered 
Registered
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Figure 10: In political elections, how important is a candidate’s position on Cuba in 
determining your vote. Would you say it is very important, moderately important, not 
very important, or not at all important?
1959-1964
1965-1973
1974-1980
1981-1994
1995-2014
42 26 17 15
42 21 14 22
37 21 17 24
48 23 19
39 27 13 21
10
%
17%
45%
22%
11%
21%
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+
34%
38%
20%
8%
27%
24%
28%
22%
  37%
25%
18%
20%
38%
26%
17%
19%
Very Important
Moderately Important
Not Very Important
Not Important at All 
Even after 55 years after the revolution, the topic of Cuba maintains a high profile in South 
Florida social, economic, political, and cultural discourse. For Cuban Americans in the region, 
Cuba is never far away, in the physical or mental geographies of daily life. In the political arena, 
a large majority of Cuban-American registered voters still consider a candidate’s position 
on Cuba to be important in determining their vote. The salience of Cuba in the local political 
discourse is placed in context in the following section. 
It is widely assumed that the salience of Cuba is accompanied by unequivocal support for the 
embargo. The responses presented in figures 11–13 show that Cuban Americans are willing 
to endorse candidates who propose policies that maintain pressure for change on the Cuban 
government and are willing to discard the embargo in exchange for new policy options.
Year Left Cuba
Age Range
Sixty-four percent of registered voters consider 
a candidate’s position on Cuba to be important in 
determining their vote.
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Figure 11: How likely would you be to vote for a candidate who supports the 
reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba?
Registered voters were asked how likely they would be to vote for a candidate for political 
office who supported the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. Fifty-three percent responded 
that they would be very likely or somewhat likely to do so. Younger voters expressed stronger 
support—75% in the 18–29 group.
Fifty-three percent of registered voters would likely vote for a 
candidate supporting the reestablishment of diplomatic relations 
with Cuba.
1959-1964
1965-1973
1974-1980
1981-1994
1995-2014
24 17 13 45
21 19 15 45
16 19 20 45
31 17 40
34 28 17 22
13
%
17%
20%
14%
15%
52%
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+
35%
35%
13%
17%
44%
31%
25%
0%
  28%
30%
15%
27%
28%
25%
31%
16%
Very Likely
Somewhat Likely
Not Very Likely
Not at All Likely
Moderatley to 
not important
Very important
19 34 20 27
41 13 10 36
%
Importance of Candidate 
Position in Cuba Vote
Year Left Cuba
Age Range
Cuban Americans are willing to 
endorse a candidate who supports 
the reestablishment of diplomatic 
relations with Cuba.
See Figure 12.
Moderately to Not 
Important
Very Important
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Figure 12: How likely would you be to vote for a candidate who supports replacing 
the embargo with increased support for independent small business owners in Cuba?
Registered voters were also asked about the likelihood of voting for a candidate who supports 
replacing the embargo with a policy that increases support for independent business owners in 
Cuba. Fifty-seven percent of the voters said they were likely to do so (very/somewhat). Seventy-
one percent of new arrivals, compared to 40% of the earliest post-revolution arrivals, said they 
were likely to do so. Almost twice as many younger voters (18–29) were likely to vote for such a 
candidate than older voters (65+)—73% to 37%.
Fifty-seven percent of registered voters would likely vote for 
a candidate supporting replacing the embargo with a policy 
increasing support for independent business owners.
1959-1964
1965-1973
1974-1980
1981-1994
1995-2014
21 19 25 36
22 20 21 37
22 20 17 40
38 19 31
45 26 13 16
12
%
33%
25%
16%
26%
Very Likely
Somewhat Likely
Not Very Likely
Not at All Likely
Moderatley to 
not important
Very important
23 32 20 26
45 15 11 27
%
Year Left Cuba
17%
21%
16%
17%
46%
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+
33%
42%
5%
20%
42%
31%
18%
9%
  39%
24%
18%
18%
Age Range
Moderately to Not 
Important
Very Important
Importance of Candidate 
Position in Cuba Vote
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Figure 13: How likely would you be to vote for a candidate who supports replacing 
the embargo with support for increasing pressure on the Cuban government over 
human rights?
The final question on embargo options asked registered voters how likely they would be to 
vote for a candidate who supports replacing the embargo with a policy that increases pressure 
on the Cuban government over human rights issues. Eighty-one percent of voters said they 
were very or somewhat likely to vote for such a candidate. A large majority of all age groups 
expressed this view. 
These responses indicate that Cubans are willing to support a shift in U.S. policy if the shift 
includes provisions that continue to exert pressure for change on the Cuban government. 
Eighty-one percent of registered voters would likely vote for 
a candidate supporting replacing the embargo with a policy 
increasing support for human rights.
1959-1964
1965-1973
1974-1980
1981-1994
1995-2014
58 13 13 16
65 14 6 15
59 19 8 14
53 20 21
65 21 6 9
7
%
17%
57%
14%
8%
21%
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+
53%
35%
2%
11%
65%
27%
2%
7%
 61%
22%
7%
10%
59%22%
13%
6%
Very Likely
Somewhat Likely
Not Very Likely
Not at All Likely
Moderatley to 
not important
Very important
52 27 8 13
70 14 13
%
3[
Importance of Candidate 
Position on Cuba Vote
Year Left Cuba
Age Range
Moderately to Not 
Important
Very Important
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Selected Trends
This section presents a comparison of key questions from this poll with our 
previous polls. Some of these comparisons highlight trends in opinions and 
behaviors of the Cuban-American population over the last 23 years. 
How this Poll Compares to Previous FIU Cuba Polls
Support for the embargo has steadily decreased within the Cuban-American population in the Miami 
area. During the 1990s, the five polls we conducted tabulated an average of 84% support for maintaining 
the embargo. Since 2000 to the present, the average support for the embargo has diminished to a little 
under 56%. This decline could largely be explained by the incorporation of post-1995 migrants into the 
population. Figure 14 presents the numbers.
87% 87% 85% 83% 78%
62% 66% 58%
45%
56%
48%
Oct-91 Jun-93 Mar-95 Jun-97 Oct-00 Mar-04 Mar-07 Nov-08 Sep-11 May-14Mar-91
Figure 14: Favor continuing embargo
Support for the Embargo
continued on next page
44% 50% 40% 37%
53%
46%
55%
68%
57%
69%
Oct-91 Jun-93 Mar-95 Jun-97 Oct-00 Mar-04 Mar-07Mar-91 Nov-08 Sep-11 May-14
Figure 15: Unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba should be allowed
Support for Unrestricted Travel
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After the 2012 president election, exit polls estimates of the Cuban-American vote for Barack 
Obama ranged as high as 49%. This poll represents the first empirical attempt at measuring the 
actual Cuban vote using a probability sample. Either the exit poll estimates were exceedingly high or 
many Cuban-American voters took the opportunity to “vote again” and rescind some of the support 
allotted to President Obama back in 2012. 
For our purposes, the current 34% support for the Democratic candidate is less significant than 
the continued decline in support for the Republican candidate. Although still a majority among 
Cuban-American voters in Miami, Republican Party registrations have declined over the years while 
Independents and Democrats have increased. This trend is changing the political landscape of the 
Cuban-American community and the nationwide significance of the Cuban-American vote.
67% 69%
66%
52%
56%
53%
16% 17% 18%
13%
27%
20%
25%
70%
Republican Democrat Independent
22%
14% 14%
23%
21%
18%
15%
Mar-91 Oct-91 Mar-04 Mar-07 Mar-08 Sep-11 May-14
Figure 16: Political party registration
Voter Registration and Presidential Vote
Lifting the restrictions on travel to Cuba for all Americans has received increasing support over the 
years. The five surveys conducted in the 1990s averaged 43% support for lifting travel restrictions, 
while the six post-2000 surveys average 58% support. The dramatic increase between the 1997 poll 
and the 2000 poll indicates that the opinions of the post-1995 migrants made a difference on this issue.
Support for Unrestricted Travel continued
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Figure 17: In the past presidential election, did you vote for Mitt Romney or Barack 
Obama, or did you not vote for either? (Asked of registered voters)
1959-1964
1965-1973
1974-1980
1981-1994
1995-2014
59 18 23
67 17 16
50 22 28
40 42 18
33 40 27
%
17%
61%
21%
17%
18-29 30-44 45-64 65+
26%
56%
18%
32%
35%
33%
 43%
34%
23%
Romney
Obama
Did Not Vote for Either
45%
34%
21%
Year Left Cuba
Age Range
1996 2000 2004 2008
Dole 60% Planning to vote for Bush – 46%
Probably vote for 
Bush – 57% McCain 65%
Clinton 40% Planning to vote for Gore – 28% Undecided – 25% Obama – 35%
Probably not for 
Bush – 17%
Cuban-American presidential votes or vote intentions in past poll about election in 
Undecided – 26%
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DISCUSSION AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
Much is made of the transitions occurring on 
the island and their impact on Cubans here and 
there. The present survey highlights an equally 
important transition taking place in the Miami area, 
a demographic, generational, and ideological shift 
that can potentially have a great impact on Cubans 
on the island, as well as Cubans in the diaspora. 
 How to deal with Cuba, 55 years after the 
revolution, is a contested issue. Older respondents 
and those leaving Cuba before 1980 as an 
aggregate are still committed to the isolation of 
Cuba from U.S. citizens and businesses. Even 
though the policies put in place in the 1960s to 
promote regime change have not had the desired 
effect, lifting the embargo, for example, is often 
viewed as a capitulation to the Cuban government. 
The more recent arrivals, particularly those coming 
since 1995, are much more likely to view the policy 
status quo as negotiable. 
 Mass migration of Cubans to Florida and 
the United States is likely to persist in the coming 
decades. The changes in the population of Cuban 
origin in South Florida will also continue on many 
levels. As our surveys show, one of the dimensions 
of change will be attitudes associated with U.S./
Cuba policy. As more new arrivals become 
integrated into the democratic processes of their 
adopted country, voices for changing the current 
policy will inevitably become louder. Existing 
policies have contributed to the transformation 
of South Florida while contributing much less 
directly to the transformation of the Cuban state. 
While it’s difficult to predict what kind of policy 
changes will occur as the Cuban-American 
population continues its transition from one 
composed mostly of exiles to one composed 
predominantly of immigrants, the current poll 
does have far-ranging policy implications:
A large majority of the Cubans 
who recently migrated to the 
United States would welcome 
changes to U.S./Cuba policy. 
Fifty-eight percent of the post-1995 
cohort favors lifting the embargo and this 
proportion is likely to grow as immigration 
from the island continues at its current pace. 
More Cubans migrated to the United States 
during the first ten years of the 21st century 
than in any previous decade since the 
revolution. The current split among registered 
voters on the question of the embargo will 
become less even as these new arrivals 
become integrated into the U.S. political 
system.
1
Cuban Americans express strong 
support for policies that increase 
contact between U.S. citizens, 
including Cuban Americans, and 
the Cuban people. Lifting the 
restrictions on travel currently in place for 
non-Cuban-American citizens receives 
strong backing not only among new arrivals 
and registered voters (80% and 58%), but 
also among all age cohorts except the 65 
and older group. Similar support is expressed 
for the continuation of “people-to-people” 
travel options.
2
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Cuban Americans express 
strong support for measures that 
increase commercial relations 
between U.S. businesses and 
Cubans on specific ventures. 
As in previous polls, support for companies 
selling medicine and food sp ans all 
cohorts. Similarly, more than 70% of the 
respondents would like to see the existing 
limited business relations between U.S. 
agricultural providers and the island either 
expanded or maintained.
3
Cuban Americans express strong 
support for maintaining Cuba on 
the State Department’s list of State 
Sponsors of Terrorism. Although 
the support for policies encouraging 
contact among Americans, Cuban Americans, 
and Cubans on the island is strong, a large 
majority of the respondents want to keep the 
sanctions on the Cuban government imposed 
by the State Department list. A distinction is 
frequently made between the people of Cuba 
and the United States and the governments 
of Cuba and the United States. Increasing 
contact between people and maintaining the 
sanctions provided by the State Department 
list have one thing in common: both exert 
pressures for change on the government, at 
different levels of abstraction from the lives 
of ordinary people. Increasing direct contact 
between people has an impact on Cubans on 
both sides of the Florida Straits. Maintaining 
Cuba on the State Department list does not 
have that direct a link to the daily lives of the 
people but sends a strong message to the 
Cuban state.
4
Current U.S. immigration policies 
directed at Cubans receive strong 
support from Cuban Americans.  
The unique immigration status of 
Cubans arriving in the United States 
receives strong backing from all cohorts, 
particularly the newer arrivals. The policies 
associated with the Cuban Adjustment Act 
and its “wet foot/dry foot” revision have 
been a focus of debate from both the right 
and the left in recent years. Clearly these 
policies have the broad support of those 
benefiting from them.
5
Cuban Americans are very 
likely to vote for candidates 
who recommend a lifting of the 
embargo in exchange for other 
policies that continue to exert 
pressure on the Cuban government for 
change. Alternatives to the embargo that 
increase support for small business owners 
and human rights pressures receive strong 
support (58% and 81% respectively). 
This attitude highlights the view of many 
respondents of the embargo as a strategic 
pressure point that could be replaced if 
other, more timely and appropriate, methods 
of pressure could be designed. 
6
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APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY
The FIU Cuba Poll has followed the same methodology over the two decades it has been 
conducted. Random digit dial (RDD) probability sampling is used to reach households, which 
are then screened for Cuban residents. No additional screening is done, although in earlier 
polls selection within the household for age and gender representativeness was done. Recently 
(including the current poll) the mix of landline and cell numbers makes that unnecessary. The 
questionnaire is always structured so that tracking questions occur in a similar context of 
questions asked before them year-to-year.
FIU contracted the services of NORS Surveys, Inc., to conduct telephone interviews among 
Cuban-American residents of Miami-Dade County. All calls were made from the NORS Surveys 
central phone location and were time-coded and maintained on a computer database. For the 
current poll, 37,766 phone numbers were dialed from RDD probability samples, resulting in 707 
cell and 293 landline interviews. Approximately 33% of the calls reached a person in a household 
and 60% of those households were screened for Cuban residents. A total of 49% of the 
households identifying as Cuban completed the interview. All interviewers from NORS Surveys 
in Miami were bilingual, with both English and Spanish questionnaire versions on the Computer 
Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system. A total of 92% of the interviews were completed 
in Spanish. 
Results were weighted by Miami-Dade 2014 American Community Survey (ACS) data on 
countywide age categories and gender for the Cuban population 18 years and older.
The questionnaire is always structured 
so that tracking questions occur in 
a similar context of questions asked 
before them year-to-year.
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Sex & Age Sample 
Proportions
Census 
Proportions
Weight
Men 18-30 0.048 0.089 1.858
Men 31-40 0.056 0.080 1.433
Men 41-50 0.069 0.109 1.569
Men 51-60 0.080 0.070 0.876
Men 61-70 0.048 0.066 1.380
Men 70+ 0.073 0.080 1.101
Women 
18-30
0.040 0.080 1.993
Women 
31-40
0.063 0.072 1.140
Women 
41-50
0.102 0.099 0.971
Women 
51-60
0.128 0.070 0.550
Women 
61-70
0.150 0.071 0.474
Women 70+ 0.144 0.114 0.794
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000
Men Women
Age Cell Landline Cell Landline
18-29 4.1% 0.2% 2.7% 0.2%
30-44 9.8% 1.1% 7.3% 0.8%
45-64 17.5% 2.2% 12.6% 5.5%
65+ 7.8% 5.4% 6.9% 13.4%
Type of Interview by Gender and Age
Weight Table
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Many questions in our survey have been asked exactly the same way for many years. Here is the wording 
of the questions presented in this report, followed by their Spanish translations. The asterisk (*) signifies 
questions unique to this survey. All the others have a long history in the FIU Cuba Poll. 
Overall, do you think the U.S. embargo of Cuba has worked very well, well, not very well, or not at all? (Figure 1) 
En términos generales, ¿cree usted que el embargo norteamericano a Cuba ha dado muy buen resultado, buen 
resultado, no muy buen resultado o ningún resultado?
Do you favor or oppose continuing the U.S. embargo of Cuba? (Figure 2)
¿Está usted a favor o en contra de que continúe el embargo a Cuba?
Over the years, the United States government has often supported different policies toward Cuba. I am going to read 
you some of the policies that have been proposed and I would like you to tell me whether you favor or oppose these 
policies. First, allow companies to sell medicine to Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly 
oppose this? (Figure 3)
Durante años el gobierno de los Estados Unidos ha apoyado a menudo diversas políticas hacia Cuba. Voy a leerle 
algunas de las políticas que se han propuesto, y me gustaría que usted me dijera si está a favor o en contra de 
ellas. Permitir que las compañías vendan medicinas a Cuba, ¿está decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, 
principalmente en contra o fuertemente en contra?
Allowing U.S. companies to sell food to Cuba, do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose 
this? (Figure 3)
Permitir que las compañías norteamericanas vendan alimentos a Cuba... ¿Está decididamente a favor, principalmente a 
favor, principalmente en contra o fuertemente en contra? 
Some U.S. companies have managed to establish limited business relations with Cuba to sell grain, other agricultural 
products, and medicine. Should this kind of trade be expanded, kept the same, or stopped? (Figure 3)
Algunas compañías en los Estados Unidos han logrado establecer relaciones limitadas para negociar con Cuba, 
vendiéndole granos, otros productos agrícolas y medicinas. ¿Debería este comercio expandirse, mantenerse igual o 
suspenderse?
Do you favor or oppose the U.S. re-establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba? (Figure 4)
¿Está usted a favor o en contra del restablecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas de los Estados Unidos con Cuba?
Should unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba be allowed or not? (Figure 5)
Los viajes sin restricciones de todos los americanos a Cuba, ¿deberían ser permitidos o no? 
*Currently, all Americans can travel to Cuba in people-to-people trips organized by special travel agencies and designed 
to encourage communication among citizens of the U.S. and citizens of Cuba. These trips are usually organized for 
educational, religious, or research purposes. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose this 
type of people-to-people travel? (Figure 6)
Actualmente, todo norteamericano puede viajar a Cuba por medio de viajes de pueblo a pueblo, organizados por 
agencias de viaje y diseñados para fomentar la comunicación entre los ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos y los 
ciudadanos de Cuba. Estos viajes se organizan por razones religiosas, educacionales o de investigación. ¿Está usted 
decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, principalmente en contra o fuertemente en contra de este tipo de viaje de 
pueblo a pueblo?
APPENDIX 2: HOW THE QUESTIONS WERE ASKED
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*Since 1966, the entrance of Cubans into the United States has been regulated by the Cuban Adjustment Act. This law 
stipulates that Cuban citizens and their accompanying spouses and children may get a green card and become residents 
of the U.S. one year after arriving in the country. This automatic application process is not usual for other immigrant 
groups. Do you strongly favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or strongly oppose the current policy of accepting Cubans 
into the U.S.? (Figure 7)
Desde 1966, la entrada de los cubanos a los Estados Unidos ha estado regulada por la Ley de Ajuste Cubano. Esta 
ley estipula que los ciudadanos cubanos y sus cónyuges e hijos acompañantes pueden obtener una tarjeta verde 
y convertirse en residentes de los Estados Unidos después de un año de llegar al país. Este proceso de solicitud 
automática no es usual para otros grupos de inmigrantes. ¿Está usted decididamente a favor, principalmente a favor, 
principalmente en contra o fuertemente en contra de la política actual de aceptar a los cubanos en los Estados Unidos?
As it stands, Cubans who leave by raft or boat are sent back to Cuba if they are intercepted before they reach U.S. soil. 
If they do reach U.S. soil they are allowed to stay in the U.S. Do you agree or disagree with this policy? (Figure 8)
En estos momentos, los cubanos que llegan por balsa o bote son devueltos a Cuba si se les intercepta antes de llegar a 
territorio norteamericano. Si llegan a territorio norteamericano, se les permite permanecer en los Estados Unidos. ¿Está 
Ud. de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta política?
*The U.S. Department of State [or U.S. government] includes Cuba on a list of four countries which the U.S. government 
considers to be State Sponsors of Terrorism. This designation penalizes persons and organizations engaging in certain 
activities with Cuba and the other countries on the list. The other countries on the list are Iran, Sudan, and Syria. Do you 
believe that Cuba should be kept on that list of penalized countries that support terrorism, or be taken off the list?
(Figure 9)
El Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos [o el gobierno de los Estados Unidos] incluye a Cuba en una lista 
de cuatro países que el gobierno estadounidense considera Estados que Patrocinan el Terrorismo. Esta designación 
penaliza a las personas que participan en ciertas actividades con Cuba y otros países de la lista. Los otros países de 
la lista son Irán, Sudán y Siria. ¿Cree usted que a Cuba se le deba mantener en esa lista de países penalizados por 
patrocinar al terrorismo o debe ser eliminada de la lista?
In political elections, how important is a candidate’s position on Cuba in determining your vote? Would you say it is very 
important, moderately important, not very important, or not at all important? (Asked only of registered voters) (Figure 10)
En las elecciones políticas, ¿cuán importante es la posición sobre Cuba de un candidato al determinar su voto? ¿Diría 
usted que es muy importante, moderadamente importante, no muy importante o nada importante?
*How likely would you be to vote for a candidate who supports the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba? 
(Figure 11)
¿Cuál es la probabilidad de que usted votara por un candidato que apoye el restablecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas 
con Cuba?
*How likely would you be to vote for a candidate who supports replacing the embargo with increased support for 
independent small business owners in Cuba? (Figure 12)
¿Cuál es la probabilidad de que usted votara por un candidato que apoye reemplazar el embargo con un mayor apoyo a 
los trabajadores por cuenta propia en Cuba?
*How likely would you be to vote for a candidate who supports replacing the embargo with support for increasing 
pressure on the Cuban government over human rights? (Figure 13)
¿Cuál es la probabilidad de que usted votara por un candidato que apoye reemplazar el embargo con una mayor presión 
sobre el gobierno cubano en materia de derechos humanos?
Are you registered as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or with some other party? (Figure 16)
¿Está usted inscrito como republicano, demócrata, independiente o con algún otro partido?
*In the past presidential elections, did you vote for Mitt Romney or Barack Obama, or did you not vote for either? 
(Figure 17)
En la pasada elección presidencial, ¿votó usted por Mitt Romney o Barack Obama o no votó por ninguno de los dos?
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About the Cuban Research Institute
FIU’s Cuban Research Institute (CRI) is dedicated to creating and 
disseminating knowledge about Cuba and Cuban Americans. The 
institute encourages original research and interdisciplinary teaching, 
organizes extracurricular activities, collaborates with other academic 
units working in Cuban and Cuban-American studies, and promotes 
the development of library holdings and collections on Cuba and 
its diaspora. Founded in 1991, CRI is the nation’s leading center for 
research and academic programs on Cuban and Cuban-American 
issues. No other U.S. university surpasses FIU in the number of 
professors and students of Cuban origin.
Since its foundation, the institute has generated an exceptional level 
of scholarship, teaching, and outreach. CRI has organized hundreds 
of academic and cultural events, covering Cuban and Cuban-
American history, politics, society, and the arts. FIU students, faculty, 
and members of the greater South Florida community are engaged 
through CRI’s stimulating series of seminars, conferences, lectures, 
concerts, book presentations, and film screenings. The public events 
and activities sponsored by the institute are made possible by grants 
and gifts by private foundations, nonprofit organizations, community 
members, and the state of Florida. 
CRI has received major support from reputable foundations, 
including Ford, MacArthur, Open Society, Christopher Reynolds, 
Rockefeller, and Tinker, as well as from the National Endowment for 
the Humanities and the National Science Foundation.
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About Florida International University
Florida International University (FIU) is Miami-Dade County’s 
first public, four-year research university. With more than 50,000 
students, 1,000+ full-time faculty members, and nearly 200,000 
alumni, FIU is one of South Florida’s anchor institutions and 
first in the nation in awarding bachelor’s and master’s degrees 
to Hispanics. FIU offers more than 180 bachelor, master, and 
doctoral degree programs in its colleges and schools. Recently, 
the university has achieved several notable milestones, including 
the establishment of South Florida’s only public College of 
Medicine and the accreditation of its College of Law.
About the College of Arts & Sciences
As the heart of a leading public research university, the College 
of Arts & Sciences plays a vital role in the intellectual, cultural, 
and civic life of local, national, and international communities. 
The college provides an educational foundation that prepares 
FIU students to be successful and engaged students in a 
global society. 
About the School of International and Public Affairs
The School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) brings 
together many of FIU’s internationally oriented disciplines 
to provide cutting-edge research, first-rate teaching, and 
innovative training necessary for the globalized world of the 21st 
century. SIPA includes eight signature departments: Criminal 
Justice, Economics, Global and Sociocultural Studies, History, 
Modern Languages, Politics and International Relations, Public 
Administration, and Religious Studies. The school also houses 
many of the university’s most prominent international centers, 
institutes, and programs.
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